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Abstract: We introduce a dynamic model of emotional behavior regulation that can generalize to a
wide range of decision dilemmas. Dilemmas are characterized by availability of mutually exclusive
goals that a decision maker is dually motivated to pursue. In our model, previous goal pursuant
decisions produce negative emotions that regulate an individual’s propensity to further pursue
those goals at future times. This emotional regulation of behavior helps explain the non-stationarity
and switching observed between so-called “preferences” revealed in repeated decision dilemmas
(e.g., by choosing A over B at time 1, then choosing B over A at time 2). We also explain how
behavior regulation under dilemma conditions is affected by the set of available options and how the
strength and decay rate of emotions affect the tendency to choose behaviors pursuant of extremely
(rather than moderately) different options over time. We discuss how emotional behavior regulation
insights provided by our model can extend to a variety of topics including approach and avoidance,
temptation and self-control, moral balancing, impulse buying and shopping momentum, dieting and
exercise, work and leisure, sleep regulation, cooperation, and competition.
Keywords: self-control; behavior regulation; decision; dilemma; emotion; dynamic choice

“Everyone must choose one of two pains: The pain of discipline or the pain of regret.”
Jim Rohn
1. Introduction
1.1. Self-Control in Decision Dilemmas
Despite the central importance of self-control and cooperation problems in everyday life, the
systems producing their dynamics have been poorly understood and remain among the most intriguing
puzzles for economists and cognitive scientists to solve (e.g., see [1]). The standard economic model
of rational choice posits a single decision making system with well-defined preferences (i.e., capable
of ordering alternatives based on the amount of utility each is expected to provide) and ability to
make optimal choices in accordance with those preferences. While this paradigm helps us understand
some observed behavior and it also provides a benchmark when describing sub-optimal deviations,
there remains a great deal of behavior that the traditional model does not explain. For instance,
many economists and cognitive scientists are puzzled by switching between “preferences” revealed
in repeated decision dilemmas (e.g., by choosing A over B at time 1, B over A at time 2, A over B
at time 3, . . . ). Also puzzling is how, under dilemma conditions, “extreme” behavior is commonly
chosen, despite available options for more moderate behavior. Others have also found anomalous
effects on behavior by altering the set of available options (e.g., [2,3]) or by manipulating the strength
and decay rate (or memory) of recent emotions (e.g., [4,5]).
Games 2017, 8, 22; doi:10.3390/g8020022
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Evolutionary psychologist and decision theorists have introduced multi-process theories of
evolved cognitive “modules” involved in decision-making [6–9] to better explain behavior regulation.
According to this perspective, several cognitive systems in one’s brain can become activated and
interact with each other in the presence of situations that they were selected to respond to. Specific
cognitive systems function to pursue specific goals. As such, the interaction between cognitive systems
can result in mutual cooperation (when they work together towards regulating behavior pursuant
of a common goal or related goals) or competition for behavior control (when they conflict with one
another and interfere with each other’s goal achievements).
In this paper, we address how conflicting cognitive systems become activated in decision
dilemmas characterized by availability of mutually exclusive goals that an individual (containing these
conflicted systems) is dually motivated to pursue. In particular, we provide a simple theory capturing
the process by which previous goal pursuant decisions produce negative emotions that regulate an
individual’s propensity to further pursue goals at future times (Section 2). Finally, we discuss how our
theory’s explanation for temporally inconsistent individual choices can be extended to a wide variety
of decision dilemmas (Section 3).
1.2. Inconsistent Intertemporal Choice
A rational decision maker (DM) with well-defined and stable preferences is expected to
consistently reveal the same choices given repeated exposure to the same set of available options
(e.g., by choosing A over B at time 1, A over B again at time 2, and so on). Yet, the preferences that DMs
reveal over time tend to be “labile, inconsistent, subject to factors we are unaware of, and not always
in our own best interests.” [10] (p. 2). Economists frequently employ the terms dynamic inconsistency
or time inconsistency to describe the phenomena where a DM shows change in her preferred choice
among options, such that a “revealed preference” can become inconsistent at another point in time.
For the past several decades, researchers (theorists and experimentalists) have been studying
inconsistent intertemporal choice in a variety of contexts. In the context of savings and rewards,
a long-standing puzzle has been to explain why decision makers prefer a small reward today to a
big reward tomorrow and, at the same time, a big reward in 1 year and 1 day to a small reward in
1 year (see [11–17] for comprehensive surveys). In the economics literature, this pattern of change
(e.g., preferring the sooner of two rewards today, but the delayed of two rewards in a year) has been
explained by a variety of discounting [18] and dual-self [19] theoretical frameworks that fit the data
better than the standard models which the behavior violates.
What the above models cannot explain is behavior that switches both back and forth between
choices upon repeated exposure to the same choice dilemma. Alternating or switching behavior
has been reported for approach and avoidance behaviors [20,21], consumers’ savings and spending
cycles [22], dieters’ overconsumption and restriction cycles [23] cycles of work and leisure [24], cycles
of sleep regulation [25] exercise cycles [26], cycles of moral and immoral behavior [27], cycles of
competitiveness and cooperation [28], and various other cycles oscillating between more restrained
and more tempting behaviors (e.g., drug and alcohol consumption, extra-marital sex, gambling,
exploitation). In many of these scenarios, DMs rationalize their indulgence as self-reward for prior
effortful restraints, and their restraint as self-punishment for their guilty indulgences [22,29,30]. In
line with this idea we provide a novel explanation for how a DM’s self-control is affected by previous
temptation-controlled and self-controlled decisions, leading to a non-stationary consumption path.
An alternative interpretation of non-stationary consumption is that consumers simply have
“preference for variety”. In the marketing literature, Ratner and colleagues [31] discuss variety seeking
behavior by consumers who know what they like yet choose not to consume liked products that were
recently consumed. Kaiser and Schwabe [32] discuss preference for variety held by consumers who
know what they like to purchase yet prefer to shop at places offering a greater variety of products
(including never and rarely bought products) over places offering slightly more competitive prices on
a smaller set of regularly purchased products including those that they like. Unlike DMs in decision
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dilemmas, variety seekers do not struggle with their decisions, rather they are expected to clearly
reveal a “preference for flexibility” in their choice of available alternatives, while DMs struggling to
show self-control strictly prefer smaller sets and reveal a “preference for commitment”.
To illustrate this difference, consider Gul and Pesendorfer’s [33] example of a decision maker who
must choose between apples and bananas in several periods.1 If the DM has preference for variety, he
would like to alternate consumption of apples and bananas over time. In this case, he would prefer
to have regular access to both apples and bananas so as to accommodate his changing tastes. On
the other hand, a DM in the type of decision dilemmas we focus on this paper is better captured by
the alternative example of a dieter who must choose between apples and cakes. If the dieter chooses
cake in one period, regret is generated—increasing the probability of choosing apples in the future,
while the alternate choice of apples causes self-control effort—increasing the probability of choosing
cakes in the future. Note that, though DMs alternate between options in both examples, the reasons
why they do are very different. We can empirically disentangle self-control dynamics from variety
seeking dynamics by looking at whether consumers prefer to “pre-commit” to smaller sets of decisions
given the opportunity; such as by paying a higher price to go to a “healthy” store where cakes are not
available. This is precisely the idea of a “Ulysses pact” [34].
1.3. Emotions and Behavior Calibration
We formalize the generation of emotions using the concept of “forgone utilities” [19,35]. The gist
of this concept is that a decision maker (DM) conflicted between two mutually exclusive goals,
cannot simultaneously maximize the utility of achieving each goal by taking an action. This is an
important consideration missing from standard rational choice models: under dilemma conditions,
each option chosen (over others available) creates unachieved goals, memories of missed opportunities,
or “forgone utilities”, which are quantified by the difference between the maximum possible utility
that was available and the realized utility (that was chosen). We interpret and model the memory of
these missed opportunities as a “stock” of forgone utilities to formalize the negative emotions that
consumers derive from previous dilemma decisions and which affect subsequent decisions.
While standard economic models have largely ignored emotions [36], emotions have received
significant attention in other disciplines. Evolutionary psychologists [7,8,37] have proposed that
emotions are functionally designed to orchestrate physiological and cognitive systems for the purpose
of predisposing those who feel or remember them to act more or less in a certain way. According to this
adaptationist perspective, distinct problems with mutually exclusive goals have led to a modular mind
that is internally conflicted at times. Emotions have co-evolved with conflicted behavioral systems
to process information about decision outcomes and available options, essentially functioning as
“guidance systems” regulating future behaviors [7]. Livnat and Pippenger’s [38] analysis of decision
making systems finds support for the perspective that, under computational constraints (e.g., expected
for organisms with limited resources), an optimal brain system may involve dynamically linked
subsystems that are in conflict with one another—consistent with a modular view of the mind and
the notion that emotions were selected for because they provided solutions for dynamic problems in
changing environments.
In this paper, we focus on negative recalibrational emotions that respond to changes in option sets
and facilitate behavior regulation for the conflicted DM via negative affective feedback (i.e., unpleasant
feelings). The common and unpleasant experience of indulgence guilt or indulgence regret (here
forward regret), experienced after an indulgence [39–41], limits the tendency to further indulge upon
future opportunity [42]. The unpleasant emotion of restraint effort (here forward effort), whether in
the form of “wistful feelings of missing out” [39] or the feeling of “mental burden”, concentration

1

We are grateful that an anonymous referee called our attention to this example emphasizing the difference between
preference for flexibility and preference for commitment.
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“fatigue” [43,44], or “painful exertions of the human will” [45] (p. 60) has been identified as commonly
experienced during and after restraint decisions that forgo more pleasurable alternatives [43,46]. The
Games 2017, 8, 22
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behavior-regulating
recalibrational effects of these emotions have already been previously described
in the psychology literature [47], though not formally modeled so as to generate careful insights
been previously described in the psychology literature [47], though not formally modeled so as to
into
the roles of emotional memory and changing option sets across repeated decision dilemmas.
generate careful insights into the roles of emotional memory and changing option sets across repeated
Though we focus on a few key emotions in our decision dilemma examples below, each particular
decision dilemmas. Though we focus on a few key emotions in our decision dilemma examples
decision dilemma will involve an appropriate set of emotions that may or may not be involved in
below, each particular decision dilemma will involve an appropriate set of emotions that may or may
other decision dilemmas.
not be involved in other decision dilemmas.

2. Behavior Regulation in a Dynamic Decision Dilemma
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See Gómez-Miñambres and Schniter [48], Section 4, for an example of a time variant set of available options.
Thaler and Shefrin [50] model the “planner” and “doer” using a principal-agent framework, similar to the agency conflict
between the owners and managers of a firm.

2
3

See Gómez‐Miñambres and Schniter [48], Section 4, for an example of a time variant set of
available options.
Thaler and Shefrin [50] model the “planner” and “doer” using a principal‐agent framework,
similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm.
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localized brain system [56–59]). Consistent with many of these dual-system notions, we assume that
when the DM faces a dilemma, the presence of available options triggers two conflicting goal pursuant
systems—each producing emotions to encourage or discourage specific behaviors.4
Our thesis is that, across most dilemmas, DMs struggle to choose a preferred course of action
because they are dually motivated by two different and mutually exclusive ideals: self-control (needed
to restrain temptation-control) and temptation-control (the innate reaction to tempting stimulus).5
We represent these ideals as utility functions: u (the self-control utility) and v (the temptation utility),
each a distinct goal and located at the extremes of the Hotelling line. We assume that, under dilemma
conditions, the goals associated with our evolved cognitive modules are differentially aligned with the
extremes of the Hotelling line (see Figure 1). Without loss of generality we consider that the u’s ideal
goal is located at zero while the v’s ideal goal is located at one.
Since available options may lay at interior locations on the interval, when the DM takes an
action that is not “ideal,” she experiences a disutility cost. By simplicity, we assume that this cost of
unachieved ideals is quadratic, so the individual utilities are given by:
u( xt ) = s − xt2

(1)

v ( x t ) = s − (1 − x t )2

(2)

where s ∈ R+ represents the DM’s sum of achieved ideals (i.e., utility when making the ideal decision).6
When the DM confronts a dilemma, she has to decide upon an action from a set of alternatives,
knowing that the choice will not maximize both ideals simultaneously and will, thus, produce
foregone utilities. Given the DM action xt in period t, the forgone utilities of competing u and
v are maxu( x ) − u( xt ) = u(m) − u( xt ) and maxv( x ) − v( xt ) = v(m) − v( xt ) respectively. Note that
x∈ M

x∈ M

resisting temptation (i.e., xt closer to m) creates a high forgone v-utility (but a low forgone u-utility),
while yielding to temptation (i.e., xt closer to m) generates a high forgone u-utility (but a low forgone
v-utility). The Hotelling interval can be interpreted as a continuum of options ranked with respect to a
particular variable dimension (e.g., price, quality, calories, sweetness, etc.).
To formalize the role of emotions in behavior regulation we build on Becker’s [67] concept of
“personal capital” that has been used widely in economic models of variety seeking, addiction, and
habit formation. This approach incorporates past consumption into the explanation of inconsistently
revealed preferences; so that functions describing the utility of decisions depend not only on current
decisions but also on the history of past consumption. Our point of departure from this idea is that
instead of simply considering previous consumption, we assume that revealed preferences depend
on the remembered history of missed opportunities. This approach allows us to incorporate the
idea of regret (the memory of missed indulgence opportunities) and effort (the memory of self-control
missed opportunities) into a dynamic dual-system model of decision making. In particular, we define
emotional capital as the sum of all previous forgone utilities, each depreciating at a constant rate. Thus,
the foregone-temptation capital transition equation is given by
et+1 = (1 − λ)et + [v(m) − v( xt )]

(3)

while the foregone-self-control capital transition equation is
gt+1 = (1 − λ) gt + [u(m) − u( xt )]

4
5
6

(4)

The earliest two-factor models of behavior regulation in psychology were introduced by William James [60] and Sigmund
Freud [61].
Automatic and mindless behavior, triggered by a stimulus, has been described by others [62–65].
Gómez-Miñambres [66] considers a similar modeling approach to formalize dual-system preferences in a monopoly pricing
model where products are horizontally differentiated.
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With initial conditions e1 = g1 = 0, and where λ ∈ [0, 1] represents the psychological depreciation
rate of emotions. We refer to (1 − λ) as emotional memory. Thus, emotional capitals are the forgone
utilities (missed opportunities from the past) remembered at a particular point in time, while additional
decisions (generating forgone utilities) continue contributing new emotions every period. Moreover,
we define a DM’s emotional balance as the difference between both kinds of emotional capital:7
Bt+1 = et+1 − gt+1 = (1 − λ) Bt + 1 − 2xt + µ

(5)

where µ = m2 − (1 − m)2 ∈ [−1, 1] is a function that depends on the boundaries of the available
option set. This function indicates that emotions depend, not only on the stock of previously generated
emotions (Bt ) and present decisions (xt ), but also on available options that are not necessarily chosen.
If µ > 0, the option set contains alternatives closer to the temptation ideal and we refer to the option
set as temptation shifted. Similarly, if µ < 0, the option set contains alternatives closer to the self-control
ideal and we refer to the option set as self-control shifted. Finally, if µ = 0, the available options do not
favor one ideal over the other and we refer to the option set as neutral.
Now we can define the following extended utility functions8 (explaining “revealed preferences”)
in period t that depend on the actual action and the emotional capital at each period:
U ( xt , et ) = u( xt ) − ρet (1 − xt )

(6)

V ( xt , gt ) = v( xt ) − ρgt xt

(7)

where ρ ∈ R+ .
The extended utility functions in our model capture the idea that a stock of negative emotions
generated by memory of foregone tempting opportunities (e) and foregone self-control opportunities (g)
impose “emotional costs” that decrease the cardinal scale of utilities. Our proposed functional form
captures the intuitive behavior-regulating recalibrational effects of emotions like self-control effort and
indulgence regret that have been previously described in the psychology literature [44,68] and marketing
literature [69,70]. While effort and regret can be used to describe the emotions generated by choices
across a variety of decision dilemmas, we conjecture that additional concomitant negative emotions
(e.g., fear, pain, nausea, craving, frustration, insecurity, guilt, embarrassment, shame, exhaustion,
fatigue) may be evoked by choice consequence in particular dilemmas (see Section 3). From V ( xt , gt ),
we know that choosing the tempting option (xt close to m) is costly and that costs were greater when
the DM yielded to temptation, and hence accumulated regret. Similarly, from U ( xt , et ) we know that

7

8

In this model we treat foregone-temptation capital (e) and foregone-control capital (g) emotions symmetrically. This assumption
is made for the sake of simplicity and exposition. Alternatively, we can consider that e and g are not equally important
emotions (a more realistic assumption). In particular, we can define the emotional balance as Bt+1 = et+1 − kgt+1 , where
k ∈ R+ is the relative weight of g with respect to e, so if k > 1 g is relatively more important than e and if k < 1 e is
relatively more important than g for the DM. The asymmetry of e and g would include a new parameter and hence an extra
degree of freedom in the model but the main qualitative results would remain unchanged.
As we mentioned above, our formalization of negative emotions as stock of previous experiences affecting current choices
is inspired by the notion of an extended utility function [67] widely used in the economic models of addiction and habit
formation. These models provide a function, not only defined by present consumption trade-offs, but also “extended” to
include a stock of past consumption, called “consumption capital”. The important feature of this class of models is that,
while preferences remain stable, they are defined by not only “ordinary goods” but also by features (e.g., past consumption,
social desirability, or emotions) not normally thought of as “goods”. Although related, our extended utility analysis includes
several novelties with important implications. First, in considering an individual’s two internally-conflicted preferences we
specify not one but two different extended utilities. More importantly, in determining the marginal utility of consumption
we model emotional capital as captured by stocks of previous forgone utilities (and their emotional consequences), not just a
single stock of previous consumption. Since forgone utilities depend upon options not chosen, the menu’s set of alternatives
(specifically, the available options) plays a very important role in determining our extended utilities, while it would be
irrelevant under the concept of consumption capital in models of addiction. Finally, our concept of negative emotions departs
from models of addiction because the emotionally regulated consumption in our model presents “adjacent substitutability”
(instead of “adjacent complementarity”) across periods. In other words, in contrast to the standard consumption capital in
models of addiction, the marginal utilities in our model decrease with the experience of negative emotions.
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resisting temptation is costly and that the costs are greater if the DM previously resisted temptation
and recalls the effort it generated.
While the primitive utility functions representing a DM’s ideals, u and v, are constant, the
extended utilities representing a DM’s revealed preferences incorporate emotional capital depend on
t and are therefore non-stationary. Thus, previous self-control decisions and the allure of available
option sets generate emotions that recalibrate the DM’s self-control, by affecting the relative weight
between conflicting extended utilities.
We assume that the DM is myopic, with no thought of the future. When deciding, the myopic DM
only takes into account her present emotional capital, not how her decisions affect future emotional
capital and hence future extended utilities and decisions. Therefore, each period the DM maximizes
her overall utility given by the sum of the extended utilities:
maxU ( x, et ) + V ( x, gt )

([P1])

x∈ M

In an online appendix we provide numerical simulations of a forward looking DM model.
However, the results that we emphasize in this paper remain unchanged. Therefore, our decision to
focus on a myopic DM is based on our desire to provide a simple model that can be easily understood
not only by theoretical economists but also by those from behavioral sciences and related fields.
Finally, note that, in contrast to a standard utility model (ρ = 0), our model implies time variant
choices.9 To see this, let’s consider M = [0, 1/2] and a DM with ρ > 0. Since the DM starts with
no emotions (i.e., U ( x1, e1) = u( x1); V ( x1, g1) = v( x1)), the action taken in the first period is
x1 = argmaxu( x1 ) + v( x1 ) = 12 . Therefore, the effort capital (e) in period 2 will be zero while the
x ∈[0, 12 ]

guilt capital (g) will be (1/4). This leads to the following extended utilities in period 2:
U ( x2, e2) = u( x2) and

(8)

V ( x2, g2) = v( x2) − ρ(1/4) x2

(9)

Therefore, the action in period 2 will be x2 = argmaxU ( x, e2 ) + V ( x, g2 ) =
x ∈[0, 12 ]

ρ
1
2 − 16

< 12 . Thus,

although the DM reveals a preference for 1/2 over –ρ/16 in period 1, she reveals the opposite in period
2. This is not the case when emotions play no role (ρ = 0).
2.2. The Optimal Decision Path
ρ

The DM’s optimal decisions are given by the solution of problem [P1]. Therefore, xt = 1/2 + 4 Bt .
Note that this means that actions are closer to the self-control ideal if the emotional balance is dominated
by the memory of foregone self-control (et < gt ) and closer to the temptation ideal if the emotional
balance is dominated by the memory of foregone temptations (et > gt ). The next proposition summarizes
the result.
Proposition 1. Let xt∗ be the optimal action in period t. Then,
xt∗ =

9

1 ρ
+ Bt
2 4

(10)

Other self-control models in the economics literature (e.g., [19,35]) only address consumers’ revealed preferences that are
stable over time, making choices time invariant. In our model, decision paths indicated by revealed preferences can be
non-stationary. Gómez-Miñambres and Schniter [48] provide a detailed discussion of the related literature and further
explore how, in contrast to the existing models, a theory with recalibrational emotions can explain the back and forth
intertemporal switching behavior that we describe here.
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!

ρ t−1
1− 1−λ− 2
with Bt = 2µ
2λ + ρ

(11)

Intuitively,
Games
2017, 8, 22 when the DM is most strongly under the influence of negative emotions generated
8 of 24
by foregone self-control opportunities, she has an easier time being “in control” of dilemma choices and
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In the following corollary we show under which
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2

(11)

Corollary 1. If ρ + 2λ < 4 there exists a stable steady state given by

Intuitively, when the DM is most strongly under the influence of negative emotions generated
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by foregone self‐control opportunities,
time being “in control” of dilemma choices and

m i f 2λ+ρ ≥ 2m − 1,

 to ). However,
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 2
∞

µρ

temptation ( closer to ).
m i f 2λ+ρ ≤ 2m − 1.
In the following corollary we show under which circumstances the decision path tends to a
stable ‘steady state’.
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We can graphically represent the stable steady state using a phase diagram:
self-control opportunities.

Figure2.2.A
A stable
stable steady
steady state
Figure
statesolution.
solution.

The horizontal axis in Figure 2 graphs the emotional balance, while the vertical axis graphs
By Corollary 1 we know that a DM’s action tends to a stable steady state when emotions have
“investments” in emotional balance (i.e., the additional emotions generated by a DM’s new
a small impact on the DM’s revealed preferences (ρ is low) or when the DM remembers most of the
decisions). Thus,
2
1 . The lines with arrows
represent the amount a DM invests in emotional balance as a function of the existing emotional
balance (
). Note how the result depends on the available set of alternatives. If the
available set of alternatives is temptation shifted (

0), an interior steady state has an emotional
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balance dominated by e, the memory of foregone tempting opportunities while if the available set of
alternatives is self‐control shifted (
0), the emotional balance is dominated by , the memory of
Games 2017, 8, 22
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foregone self‐control opportunities.
By Corollary 1 we know that a DM’s action tends to a stable steady state when emotions have a
small
on the
DM’s
revealed
preferences
( equivalent
is low) or when
theDM’s
DM remembers
most
of the
previousimpact
emotions
(λ is
low).
Note that,
although
in the
actions, both
cases
have
previous emotions ( is low). Note that, although equivalent in the DM’s actions, both cases have
different implications for DM’s payoffs. In the first case emotions do not impose significant costs and
different implications for DM’s payoffs. In the first case emotions do not impose significant costs and
hence do not have a big impact on decisions. However, in the second case the emotions, although
hence do not have a big impact on decisions. However, in the second case the emotions, although
costly, calibrate decisions and achieve consistent behavior.
costly, calibrate decisions and achieve consistent behavior.
In the following corollary we summarize the effect of available alternatives on the decision path.
In the following corollary we summarize the effect of available alternatives on the decision path.
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utility will be high. In both cases the absolute value of emotional balance in the next period (| B2|) will
be high. As a result, the difference between choices across periods (|
|) will be high as well.
be high. As a result, the difference between choices across periods (| xt+1 − xt |) will be high as well.
In Figure 3 we plot the decision path of the myopic DM with a temptation shifted option set.

In Figure 3 we plot the decision path of the myopic DM with a temptation shifted option set.

Figure
3. Decision
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with
4) and
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higher((ρ +22λ >4)4)
impact
emotions
Figure
3. Decision
paths
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lower(ρ( + 2λ
2 < 4)
impact
of of
emotions
andand
depreciation
rate.
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notethat
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It is
totonote
of self‐control
self-controldepends
dependsonon
model’s
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The
decision
path
follows
compensatory
temptation‐controlled
and
self‐controlled
parameters. The decision path follows compensatory temptation-controlled and self-controlled cycles
cycles where the DM alternates between periods of yielding to temptation, and hence high regret ( ),
where
the DM alternates between periods of yielding to temptation, and hence high regret (g), with
with periods of resisting temptation, and hence high effort ( ). If the impact of negative emotions ( )
periods of resisting temptation, and hence high effort (e). If the impact of negative emotions (ρ) and the
and the depreciation rate ( ) are sufficiently high, this behavior persists indefinitely. Otherwise, the
depreciation rate (λ) are sufficiently high, this behavior persists indefinitely. Otherwise, the amplitude
amplitude of cycles decreases over time as decisions approach a stable steady state. Therefore, we
of cycles decreases over time as decisions approach a stable steady state. Therefore, we can explain
can explain both dynamically stable (e.g., moderation) and unstable (e.g., abstinence‐binge) behavior
both
stable (e.g.,
fordynamically
particular parameters
ofmoderation)
the model. and unstable (e.g., abstinence-binge) behavior for particular
parameters of the model.

3. Discussion: The Role of Negative Emotions in Dynamic Decision Dilemmas
The model presented above can help us understand how negative emotions like regret and effort
affect dynamics of behavior in the presence of decision-dilemmas by adapting decisions to available
option sets, why self-control and cooperation failures are common (despite intentions to stay in control),
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why DMs in repeated decision dilemmas reveal a switching of so-called “preferences” over time, and
why the amplitude of this switching pattern increases with the impact but decreases with the recall of
previously generated emotions. One intuitive rationale behind this switching pattern is that DMs want
to “launder” their mind of negative emotions by compensating an action with its opposite in the next
period. This also helps explain consistent choice of extreme alternatives over moderate alternatives
available. This process is referred to as “moral balancing” in the psychology literature on moral
self-regulation [71]. Much in line with our own theoretical predictions, Cornelissen and colleagues [27]
conduct several experiments to show the existence of two contrasting decision paths: moral consistency
and moral balancing. For individuals showing moral consistency, behaving ethically or unethically
increases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behavior later on, while individuals showing
moral balancing tend to switch between ethical and unethical decisions over time. As we discussed
above, our model predicts the existence of these two different types of behaviors depending on the
degree of negative emotions and the emotional memory of subjects (see Figure 3). DMs with high
emotional memory and/or low impact of negative emotions tend to a stable decision path (moral
consistency) while those individuals with low emotional memory (i.e., who only remember the most
recent emotions) and/or high impact of negative emotions tend to an unstable, temporally inconsistent
decision path. The remainder of this section is dedicated to a discussion of how to apply these ideas to
better understand the role of negative emotions in behavior regulation across a variety of dynamic
decision dilemmas.
We propose that a wide variety of decision dilemmas can be understood in terms of conflicting
choices between mutually exclusive goals. In addition, while most choice dilemmas involve a conflict
between more desirable short-term goals and more-aversive and effortful long-term goals, not all
dilemmas are easily framed this way (e.g., consider the approach/avoidance dilemmas where DM’s are
conflicted by two visceral systems, discussed in Section 3.1). We suggest to our readers that dilemmas
should be considered in adaptive design-specific terms: by considering the evolutionary pressures our
ancestors faced (and which, via natural selection, shaped the selection of our minds), we can identify
fundamental conflicting elements of particular decision dilemma situations. We caution against
embracing general-purpose dual-system models of behavior regulation (see Stanovich for are review
of these [1]).10 If the cognitive modules regulating our behaviors evolved in gradual steps through
natural selection, they are likely to be hierarchically organized, with some design features widely
shared across brain systems and others specific to particular processes and information inputs [72].
As such, pursuit of a long-sighted goal in one kind of decision dilemma (requiring willful “control”)
should not necessarily affect the DM’s tendency towards long-sighted (as opposed to short-sighted)
goal pursuit in another kind of decision dilemma (though it might in some situations).
Finally, we caution the reader to recognize that what one DM considers a “tempting” alternative
vs. an alternative requiring “self-control” may be conceptualized in a diametrically opposed manner
by another DM with different emotional responses and habits. For example, while many people are
“reluctant workers” who experience a guilt-dominated struggle to be more diligent workers and ignore
the leisure temptations which too often frustrate their goal of being more productive, “workaholics”
experience quite the opposite, they regret that they work too much and find that they experience
frustration and effort when they try to muster enough self-control to the take breaks from their work
schedule that will provide them needed rest, relaxation, or socialization (for further discussion see
Section 3.4). Consistent with our model, we expect that all dilemma conditions (even those less

10

A popular string of literature in economics, not mention in this section, proposes to formalize individual decision making
in terms of a battle between two opposing forces such as the “hot system” versus the “cool system” [73], “doing” versus
“planning” [50], “now” versus “later” [74], and “temptation” versus “commitment” [19]. This intrinsic conflict between
opposing systems of cognition constitutes an essential part of the explanation for impulsivity in economic decisions. The
reader interested in the technical details of these types of decision models can find a comprehensive survey of the literature
in Lipman and Pesendorfer [75]. We also discuss some of these papers as well as the differences and similarities of a model
with emotions in Gómez-Miñambres and Schniter [48].
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represented among most people) produce negative emotions consequent of choices made and goals
foregone. Below we present a table of decision dilemma scenarios that includes characterizations
of decision makers who experience the dilemmas from more commonly encountered or “normal”
perspectives as well as from opposite or perhaps “abnormal” perspectives (see Table 1).
Table 1. Decision dilemmas, conflicting goals, benefits and possible negative emotional consequences
of differential goal pursuit.

Topic and Decision
Dilemma *

Decision Maker
Habit or Type

Goal 1—Temptation Utility
(Benefits of Achieving Goal 1) †
[Possible Negative Emotions from
Foregoing Goal 2]

Goal 2—Control Utility
(Benefits of Achieving Goal 2) †
[Possible Negative Emotions from
Foregoing Goal 1]

a. “Scaredy-cat”

Avoid danger
(Morbidity/mortality reduction)
[craving, frustration]

Obtain resource
(Consumption gratification)
[effort, fear, pain]

b. “Greedy person”

Obtain resource
(Consumption gratification)
[regret, fear, pain]

Avoid danger
(Morbidity/mortality reduction)
[effort, craving, frustration]

a. “Impulsive shopper”,
“Spendthrift”

Purchase
(Satisfy acquisition needs, satiate
consumption cravings)
[regret, guilt]

Save
(Maintain wealth and
purchasing power)
[effort, anxiety, craving]

b. “Tight-wad”,
“Miser”

Save
(Maintain wealth and
purchasing power)
[craving, regret]

Purchase
(Satisfy acquisition needs)
[effort, frustration]

a. “Overweight dieter”

Consume, overindulge
(Satiation, gratification)
[regret, guilt]

Abstain or restrain
(Morbidity/mortality reduction,
avoid weight gain)
[effort, exhaustion, craving]

b. “Competitive eater”,
“Anorexic”,
“Persistence hunter”

Abstain or restrain
(Avoid feeling over-full, avoid
unpleasant consumption, avoid
weight gain/delay)
[regret]

Consume, overindulge
(Gain competitive eating ability;
Stock-up on nutrition)
[effort, pain, nausea]

a. “Sedentary
non-athlete”,
“Burn-out athlete”

Do not Exercise, do not maintain
regular exercise schedule
(Avoid effort and opportunity costs
of exercise)
[guilt, regret, depression]

Exercise, maintain schedule
(Maintain/ improve fitness and
health; Achieve personal goals;
Reduce exercise effort and pain)
[effort, exhaustion, pain]

b. “Fitness freak”,
“Exercise dependent
athlete”

Exercise, maintain schedule
(Maintain or improve fitness/low
effort habit; Avoid exercise
withdrawal costs, Achieve
personal goals)
[fatigue, regret]

Do not Exercise
(Rest/tissue repair, rejuvenation;
Avoid opportunity costs of exercise)
[effort, guilt, frustration, anxiety,
craving, depression, pain]

a. “Reluctant worker”

Leisure
(Relaxation, recreation, socialization,
gratification)
[guilt, regret]

Work
(Labor production)
[effort, frustration, craving,
exhaustion]

b. “Workaholic”

Work
(Labor production; Achieve personal
goals)
[fatigue, exhaustion, regret]

Leisure
(Relaxation, recreation, socialization)
[effort, frustration, anxiety, craving]

a. “TV binge-watcher
tempted to stay up late
watching”

Wakeful activity
(Avoid opportunity costs associated
with sleep)
[regret, guilt, exhaustion]

Restorative sleep
(Improve health and long-term
productivity; Wake refreshed)
[effort, frustration, craving]

b. “Tired machine
operator/driver”,
“Worker or student
pulling an all-nighter”

Restorative sleep
(Reduce driving/operating danger;
Improve health and long-term
productivity; Wake refreshed)
[frustration, regret]

Wakeful activity
(Operate machine/drive for longer;
Improve short-term productivity or
information recall)
[effort, guilt, craving, exhaustion]

I. Approach/
avoidance:

II. Consumer
purchasing:

III. Diet regulation:

IV. Exercise
regulation:

V. Work/leisure:

VI. Sleep regulation:
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Table 1. Cont.

Topic and Decision
Dilemma *

VII. Charity and
helping behavior:

Decision Maker
Habit or Type

Goal 1—Temptation Utility
(Benefits of Achieving Goal 1) †
[Possible Negative Emotions from
Foregoing Goal 2]

Goal 2—Control Utility
(Benefits of Achieving Goal 2) †
[Possible Negative Emotions from
Foregoing Goal 1]

a. “Self-interested
tightwad”

Keep, withhold, refuse (Maintain
capital) [guilt, embarrassment, shame]

Donate, help, give (Help others)
[effort, regret, frustration]

b. “Altruistic”,
“Ascetic”

Donate, help, give
(Help others; self-discipline; achieve
personal goals)
[craving, regret]

Keep, withhold, refuse
(Maintain capital)
[guilt, embarrassment, shame, effort,
frustration]

a. “ Non-cooperator”,
“Exploiter”,
“Opportunist”

Lie, defect, cheat, exploit, defend
(Short-term gain, security, and
exploitation of available opportunity)
[guilt, embarrassment, shame]

Tell truth, trust, reciprocate, cooperate,
share
(Develop cooperative relationship;
Avoid contracting, monitoring,
defense)
[effort, craving]

b. “Cooperator”,
“Trusting trustor”,
“Trustworthy
reciprocator”

Tell truth, trust, reciprocate,
cooperate, share
(Develop cooperative relationship;
Avoid contracting, monitoring,
defense)
[craving]

Lie, defect, cheat, exploit, defend
(Short-term gain, security, and
exploitation of available opportunity)
[effort, guilt, embarrassment, shame]

VIII. Trust,
cooperation:

* Citations for dilemma topics are found in Section 3.1; † Control (temptation) utilities entail potential social benefits
(costs). Demonstration of self-control may bring reputation benefits (e.g., increased status) while avoiding status
loss and costly emotions (e.g., guilt, embarrassment, shame) associated with being “out of control” and choosing
less socially desirable options. In other contexts, those who demonstrate too-much self-control accrue costs [76].

3.1. Approach and Avoidance
The theory described in Section 2 relies on the fundamental idea that the regulation of decisions
made under dilemma conditions can be explained by dynamics of conflicting cognitive systems
(mathematically formalized as utility functions). In other words, an essential micro-foundation of
our model is the now well-established idea that the brain is composed of different modules (or parts)
sometimes working together towards a common goal but at other times in a direct competition to
influence the DM’s pursuit of mutually exclusive goals.
More than fifty years ago, Olds and colleagues [77,78] first provided evidence of separate neural
mechanisms involved in pleasure and pain. Miller’s [79] classic research on conflict presented rats
with a stimulus that created an approach/avoidance dilemma: it provided both reward (i.e., food)
and punishment (i.e., electrical shock)—causing oscillation between approach and avoidance. Similar
behavioral evidence of distinct internally-conflicted systems later came from Berridge and Grill’s [80]
study of taste responses in rats, indicating that when a combined solution of sucrose (sweet) and
quinine (bitter) is tasted, it triggers vigorous alternation between the opposing reflexes associated with
continued intake and rejection behaviors. Structures and functions of what later became better known
as “approach and avoidance” systems were understood with greater clarity by later studies [81–83].
Bargh and colleagues [20,21] demonstrated parallel approach and avoidance responses in humans,
in the absence of conscious awareness, and others have demonstrated similar effects using other
behavioral responses that correspond to approach and avoidance dispositions [84–86]. Together,
these studies further support the idea that peoples’ approach and avoidance of stimuli can function
quite automatically—that is, without conscious control over the speed of their responses or conscious
awareness of the association between responses and approach/avoidance motivation. Nevertheless,
because individuals may become aware of their propensities towards avoidance over approach (e.g.,
those of us labeled “scaredy-cats”) or approach over avoidance (e.g., those of us identified as “greedy”),
DMs in these otherwise “automatic” dilemmas may attempt to engage self-control efforts, sometimes
with success and other times with failure. We consider approach-avoidance dilemmas and emotional
consequences of differential goal pursuit from a self-control perspective for two distinct types of DM
in Table 1.
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More recent developments in neuroscience confirm that distinct brain circuitry underlies
emotional regulation of conflicting goal-pursuant modules [87]. For instance, in adults and infants,
electroencephalography (EEG) has shown that arousal of positive, approach-related emotions
(e.g., in response to positive events) is associated with selective activation of the left frontal region, while
arousal of negative, withdrawal-related emotions (e.g., in response to negative events) is associated
with selective activation of the right frontal region [88–90]. Other brain imaging studies have also
shown that two separate neural subsystems are activated when self-control problems are faced [56,58].
Self-control problems, many of which we review in Sections 3.2–3.6 below, span a wide variety
of individual-decision phenomenon, some of which bear relationship to social-dilemma problems
discussed in Section 3.7.
3.2. Impulse Buying, Shopping Momentum
Efficient and tempting media advertisement via radio, television, print, and internet has created an
ubiquitous self-control problem for consumers with limited spending ability who now face unlimited
temptations available for purchase. While some consumers are cursed to be “tight wads” and “misers”
with tendency to save and forgo opportunities to purchase desired or even needed items, then later
regret and crave those missed opportunities, the great majority of consumers tend towards quite the
opposite pattern: demonstrating characteristics of “impulse shoppers”. We consider buyer dilemmas
and emotional consequences of differential goal pursuit from a self-control perspective for two distinct
types of DM in Table 1.
“Impulse” buying generally refers to purchases that depart from normal purchase patterns for the
consumer, and that may be influenced by strong emotions and subsequent dissatisfaction or regret [91].
Since credit opportunities have increasingly made impulse buys “easier” and thus generated more
associated problems, impulse buying has received a great deal of attention. Our model, and in
particular the important role of recalibrational emotions produced by past decisions, may help explain
impulse-shopping cycles of indulgence and restraint [22].
The idea that a DM’s recent behavioral history can shape their current decision has been explored
by Dhar and colleagues [92] who report extensive evidence that the likelihood of purchasing a
subsequent item (the “target”) increases with the purchase incidence of an initial, unrelated item
(the “driver”). This “shopping momentum effect” is consistent with many commercial practices
(loss leaders, strategic shelf-space allocation, promotions encouraging a first purchase, etc.) that rely
on the consumer’s past consumption decisions to provide a psychological impulse affecting their
subsequent decisions.
In Section 2, we formalized a compensatory decision cycle of a conflicted DM affected by negative
emotions (e.g., indulgence regret and self-control effort). This same decision cycle has been found in
consumption. For instance, Förster and colleagues [29] argue that when DMs with conflicting goals
recall past behaviors, they tend to inhibit previously fulfilled goals and instead activate unfulfilled ones.
Similarly, Read and colleagues [93] argue that recalling a past decision at the point of making a current
decision serves to bracket the two decisions together and hence increases the probability that the prior
decision will have an influence on the current decision. As in the moral self-regulation literature, this
influence could result in consistent behavior, with the same decision repeated again and again, or it
could result in switching behavior, such that the opposite of the last decision is always chosen.
3.3. Diet Regulation: Feasting and Fasting
Food intake is regulated with help of salient and cognitively intrusive hunger and satiation
impulses [94]. While these physiological impulses usually correspond to one’s energy balance and
state of abdominal bloat, there are emotional factors and ecological contexts (e.g., menu effects) that
greatly influence eating behavior. Human eating behavior presents a puzzle because it manifests
as more irregular than energy balance models expect. For a menu of consumption opportunities,
non-pathological humans will demonstrate deliberate overeating (e.g., feasting: where more energy
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is taken in than had been expended since last meal) or deliberate dietary restriction (e.g., fasting:
where one abstains from taking in available energy needed to recoup energy losses since last meal),
such as while enduring effortful activities, or even for reasons as mundane as to better enjoy a large
dinner. For example, describing analyses of data from the Beltsville one year dietary study [95],
Casper and Beaton [96] describe “normal” day-to-day cycles of caloric consumption cycling between
positive and negative energy balance among non-bulimic samples. In a note elaborating on Becker and
Murphy [97], Dockner and Feichtinger [98] show cyclical consumption introducing two consumption
capitals (eating capital and weight capital) in an extended utility function, consistent with the normal
everyday behavior that we struggle to control—with occasional success and failure.
The “self-control” ability to deliberately regulate diet beyond the directives of a homeostatic
energy balance system likely co-evolved with a suite of behavioral responses that helped humans
forage optimally in environments characterized by mobile prey, shifting patchy resources, regular
threats of food scarcity, and the need to constantly migrate in search of more bountiful resources [99].
Under those ancestral conditions, there were likely scenarios where available resource patches would
need to be abandoned in search of new (and hopefully better) opportunities, or where persistence
tracking of prey would require those involved to forego consumption opportunities in the hope of
acquiring greater returns. We suggest, as have others, that the human physiological abilities to acquire
high levels of fat by “feasting” or over-eating, to convert stored resources into energy while fasting,
and to promote effortful behavior are adaptive responses to the selection pressures of feast and famine
cycles [100–102].
Experiments have demonstrated that feasting and fasting cycles have distinct effects on patterns of
weight gain (loss) and are strongly driven by recalibrational negative emotions. In the 1940 Minnesota
Starvation Experiment, healthy male volunteers were subjected to severe caloric restriction over a
period of 24 weeks, followed by gradual restoration of calories over a 12-week rehabilitation phase.
These dieters became progressively disturbed by negative emotions and obsessively focused on food
(not only talking and thinking about food constantly, but also buying cookbooks, developing recipes
and even dreaming about food), even after the refeeding period had begun. During the period of
refeeding, Keys and colleagues [103] noted that fat accumulated at an abnormally fast rate and well
past the baseline level, leading to “weight overshoot”. Weight overshoot, attributed to dietary restraint
followed by binge eating has been documented in other studies following severe caloric restriction [104].
Pathological consumption patterns (e.g., anorexia and bulimia) that also cycle between periods of
bingeing and compensatory fasting [105,106] are well documented by psychiatric and health-care
professionals who also note that these consumption patterns are closely related with and regulated
by negative emotional experiences. In particular, as a consequence of these extreme consumption
behaviors, individuals report high negative affect (e.g., guilt) after bingeing and purging [107,108]. We
present two sides of a diet regulation self-control problem as experienced by different types of decision
makers in Table 1: for example, the overweight dieter who is tempted to feast and then regretful and
guilted into effortful fasting and restraint, and the anorexic who suffers from a tendency to abstain or
restrain from eating. Interestingly, negative emotions like effort, pain and even nausea experienced
by the anorexic are also experienced by those who need to over-eat for strategic reasons, for example,
competitive eaters training to increase their consumption tolerance and stomach capacity [109], and
people preparing for extended strenuous activity with little food—such as seen with long distance
migration or persistence hunting that were characteristics of our evolutionary ancestry [110].
Mukhopadhyay and colleagues [30] found evidence that impulsive consumers who recalled
resisting (yielding to) the temptation of eating tasty but unhealthy food demonstrated temporally
inconsistent choices; upon repeated exposure to tempting options they experienced greater activation
of the unfulfilled self-control (temptation) ideal of recent past choices. Thus, as our model shows,
recently indulgent consumers who recall their behaviors tend to show control when facing temptations
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again and recently restrained consumers tend to yield to temptation when recalling their self-control.11
Finally, an important result of our model is that decisions evolve over time so as to adapt to the set
of available options. If the option set is temptation shifted, effort will dominate, down-regulating
appeal of the self-control ideal and bringing decisions closer to the temptation ideal. Similarly, if
the option set is self-control shifted, guilt will dominate down-regulating temptation and bringing
decisions closer to the self-control ideal. This result is consistent with concerns raised by nutritionists
that expanding portion sizes have contributed to the rise of obesity in United States. In line with our
model, Rolls and colleagues [2] found evidence that availability of large portions of food contribute to
excess consumption when compared to small portions of food.
The self-control problems associated with diet-regulation bear similarity with self-control
problems associated with the wide range of vices that many people struggle with (e.g., alcohol,
smoking, drugs, sex, gambling)—especially those people referred to as “hedonists” and “myopics”.
While most people have a tendency to state preferences aligned with long-term goals, their revealed
preferences favor short-term goals when they switch to preferences aligned with what are considered
“vices” (alternatives that are more pleasurable to consume in the short-run) from "virtues" (alternatives
that benefit the consumer more in the long-run) as the decision moment draws closer. For many of us,
vices can become addictive and lead to strong feelings of regret and guilt. A minority of us can and
do refrain from indulgence and are characterized as “conservative”, and in the extreme, “ascetic”. The
overly self-controlled who too-often shun short-term pleasures actually experience self-control regret
and uncomfortable feelings of having missed out [39].
3.4. Exercise vs. Rest
More than one-third of adults and 17% of youth in the United States are obese, with insufficient
exercise given dietary intake a major cause [111]. Many have been puzzled by the heterogeneity
observed in body mass, dietary and exercise habits and by the constant self-control struggles that
people engage in with regards to these behaviors.
According to Adams and Kirkby [26], regular bouts of vigorous exercise (e.g., 5 times a week)
with occasional “days off” (i.e., not running) can lead to emotionally variable cycles characterized
by “dependency” and “withdrawal” symptoms. Regular exercise is psychologically rewarding,
providing intrinsic motivation to continue exercise behavior [112,113] despite associated costs such as
accumulated injuries, neglected commitments to family and work [114], and medical advice explicitly
recommending to take days off [115]. It is this addiction to exercise that explains why despite a
tendency towards rest for the average “sedentary person”, “fitness freaks” develop dedicated habits
of engaging in daily exercise. Nevertheless, injuries, sickness, or commitments sometimes require
dedicated athletes to take days off from their exercise schedule, which for many can lead to adverse
psychological states. We consider exercise dilemmas and emotional consequences of differential goal
pursuit from a self-control perspective for two distinct types of DM in Table 1.
Robbins and Joseph [116] surveyed 345 runners (both genders, both competitive and
noncompetitive) who ran regularly and reported that most runners, when forced to miss a run,
reported withdrawal symptoms including a substantial level of distress from negative emotions such
as irritability, restlessness, frustration, guilt, regret, and depression. Significantly higher levels of low
mood and negative emotions on days off compared to running days have been reported among a
number of other samples of regular runners [115,117–119]. In some cases, the depression associated
with this exercise withdrawal produces “burn-out athletes” who choose extended non-exercise (despite

11

As in Cornelissen et al. [27] there is another type who is able to achieve stable decisions over time. Mukhopadhyay and
colleagues [30] refer to them as “non-impulsive consumers”. As we mentioned above, our model predicts the existence of
both impulsive and non-impulsive types depending on the degree of impact of negative emotions and memory of past
experienced emotions.
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opportunity to return to regular exercise), similar to the behavioral tendency observed with sedentary
non-athletes [120].
An interesting phenomenon that our model may help explain is that regular runners often run
longer on days before or after their days off to avoid the distress produced by not running [115,116]. The
motivational role of negative emotions produced by exercise withdrawal not only causes compensatory
up-regulation in exercise bout durations, but may motivate habit formation characterized by continued
participation in regular exercise routines. One runner who suffers extreme guilt when he cannot run,
explained: “I am glad, however, that I feel this way because it is the watchdog which makes sure I do
my running” (quoted in [121]).
3.5. Work vs. Leisure
Another type of decision dilemma that most individuals struggle with is: work vs. leisure. While
some workers (e.g., “workaholics”) find their jobs very engaging and have trouble taking time out to
enjoy leisure, most people are “reluctant workers” who struggle to ignore available leisure options and
rely on self-control to accomplish necessary work despite the aversive feelings of effort and exhaustion
that it produces. We consider worker dilemmas and emotional consequences of differential goal
pursuit from a self-control perspective for two distinct types of DM in Table 1.
In recent years new technologies have exacerbated the decision dilemma of work vs. leisure.
In fact, nowadays most workers in developed countries have regular access to the Internet via
their smartphones, tablets, and personal computers, providing them an omnipresent and tempting
alternative to effortful tasks such as work [122]. Perhaps as a consequence of the ubiquity of Internet
access in the modern workplace, American employees are allocating about 13% of their on-the-job
time to browsing the Internet (for non-work related purposes), and about an equal amount of time on
other non-work related activities [123]. A similar rise in Internet use, interspersed with other work
activity, is also reported for university students [124]. Corgnet and colleagues [125] studied the impact
of Internet availability on a paid mental arithmetic task in the laboratory—finding that participants
made regular use of the internet as a non-paid leisure activity, to break up the monotony of the effortful
arithmetic task. Though not all were affected by the leisure option, those participants who switched
frequently between work and leisure activity suffered the largest reductions in productivity. Indeed,
on-the-job internet browsing has been shown to negatively impact workers’ productivity [126,127]
and has cost U.S. corporations more than $85 billion a year [128]. The effortful nature of work and the
enjoyable nature of leisure activities (whether on-the-job or off-the-job) provide workers everywhere
an inescapable decision dilemma: work or leisure? Our model can help explain the self-control
failures observed among many workers struggling with this dilemma, and can also help explain the
heterogeneity in work patterns observed for different kinds of workers.
3.6. Staying Awake Vs. Sleeping
Staying awake vs. sleeping presents a decision dilemma that many may have actually experienced
from opposite perspectives at different points of time and in different situations. For example, people
sometimes find themselves in position of needing sleep despite temptations which can keep them
awake (e.g., the “TV binge-watcher tempted to stay up late watching”). For these types, it takes self-control
to forego the temptations otherwise keeping them awake. There are also situations where we struggle
to stay awake, despite the temptation to fall asleep: consider the “tired driver or machine operator” trying
to get a little more driving or work done, or the “student pulling an all-nighter” who crams for an exam.
These latter examples characterize people who attempt to utilize self-control to stave off the temptation
of sleeping so as to accomplish something. We consider sleep dilemmas and emotional consequences
of differential goal pursuit from a self-control perspective for two distinct types of DM in Table 1.
Many of us find ourselves in both kinds of self-control dilemmas: being tempted to sleep too little,
then at some later point in time being tempted to sleep too much. For example, many adolescents and
adults across the world get less sleep than they need during weekdays [35]. For most, this decreased
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nocturnal sleep is associated with increasingly delayed bedtimes, yet fixed morning wake-up times
(e.g., for school or work). As a result, adolescents and adults have a tendency to “sleep-in”, and sleep
for longer on weekends in an effort to “catch up” on this insufficient sleep [129,130]. Weekend catch-up
sleep reduces sleepiness, making it more difficult to fall asleep on subsequent weekdays, producing
a recurring cycle of sleep deprivation through the week and recovery sleep on weekends [131]. Our
model can help us understand the successes and failures of behavior regulation efforts in these different
situations as well as the cycling between under- and over-sleeping that most people experience.
3.7. Social Dilemmas: Trust, Cooperation, Contest, and Competition
Many social dilemmas involve tradeoffs between two goals: cooperation (or trust) and
non-cooperation (or exploitation), and present DMs uncertainty—since interaction partners may
be more tempted to cooperate than defect or else more tempted to defect than cooperate (see types
described in Table 1). One such dilemma is the Investment game modelled by Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe [131], which is also commonly referred to as the Trust game. From a short-sighted perspective,
the Trust game provides opportunity for gaining available resources. From a longsighted perspective,
the Trust game provides the possibility of developing the foundations for a trust-based exchange
relationship that our minds consider a security against income risks associated with luck-based
asymmetries (such as resulting from the 50% chance of being the investor in this kind of game).
According to the recalibrational perspective suggested by Schniter, Shields, and Sheremeta [132], the
investor’s decision trades off his shortsighted “opportunistic” goal (achieved with earnings from a kept
endowment and a maximally profitable investment) with pursuit of his long-sighted “cooperative”
goal (achieved by developing an exchange relationship in which both trust and trustworthiness are
maximally demonstrated). Likewise, the trustee, having received a trust-based multiplied transfer of
funds from the investor, must decide whether to pursue her short-sighted program’s goal by keeping
this income, or else pursue her longsighted program’s goal. The trustee’s long-sighted program’s goal
is to develop a trust-based exchange relationship by returning an amount equal to or greater than
what the investor originally sent and thereby demonstrating her trustworthy cooperativeness. After a
Trust game, an individual’s integration of new information (from trust-based decisions and interaction
outcomes) triggers the activation of “immediate” positive and negative emotions serving subsequent
short- and long-sighted goal pursuits. Schniter and colleagues [132] have identified Trust game
outcomes that trigger suites of specific emotional responses including mixed or “conflicted emotions”,
and have additionally demonstrated that the recalibrational emotions, predictably triggered by Trust
game outcomes, are predictive of subsequent behaviors in rematched Trust game interactions [133].
A few others have also proposed multiple-system models of behavior regulation in social
dilemmas. Schino and Aureli [134] describe ‘attitudinal-based’ reciprocity, which has also been called
‘emotional book-keeping’. Their perspective assumes that DMs automatically update a cognitive
account after experiencing an emotionally positive or negative interaction with a social interaction
partner.12
In line with the notion of moral balancing described above, Khan and Dhar [136] provide
experimental evidence of unstable, temporally inconsistent decision paths in charitable giving: Donors
in their study are less willing to donate money to charity if they have previously committed to helping
a foreign student. According to our model, these examples of unstable, temporally inconsistent
decision paths are expected for DMs with poor emotional memory and/or who experience strong
negative emotions. In other cases (such as where emotional memory is strong, or where the experience
of recalibrational emotions is weak) we could expect steady states for behavioral types who get

12

Related to these concepts of emotional or reputational capital, Rabin [135] proposed a model of a self-interested DM without
moral concerns, but guided by a system that imposes self-restraint whenever tempting actions produce a negative externality
on others. In his model, if social harm is not a consequence, then the DM can pursue self-interested and immoral actions.
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characterized for their habits as either “communal pacifists” (preferring to avoid competition) or
“agentic competitors” (preferring to engage in contests).
A large theoretical literature on contests (reviewed by [137]) suggests that the decision to compete
or refrain from competition may also share rudiments with and parallel decision dilemmas mentioned
in trust game and prisoner dilemma settings [59],13 and models of spatial market competition [142].14
A typical prediction for contests is that agents compete at the level where marginal benefit of winning
the contest equals to the marginal cost of competing. An experimental literature, however, finds that
for most (though not all) competition is more aggressive than predicted (see [28] for review) and that
more frequent conflict increases negative emotions [143]. It is a long-standing puzzle why participants
compete more than predicted [144]. One explanation offered is that contestants are motivated by a
non-monetary utility of winning [145] that could be experienced emotionally (e.g., via a sense of pride
or satisfaction). More recently, Sheremeta [146] provided evidence that overly competitive behavior
of participants can be understood as a consequence of impulsivity (i.e., an inability to restrain the
temptation-driven system). Krakel [147] shows that positive (negative) emotions resulting from contest
feedback recalibrate contestants efforts to compete harder (less hard) in subsequent contests. Due to
their reliable roles in behavior regulation, expressions of felt emotions can also function as gaurantors
of threats, promises, and credible messages in strategic interactions [148]. We expect that recalibration
emotions can explain some of the puzzling heterogeneity in contest behavior including, occasional
over-investment and under-investment (given available information and feedback). While the contest
literature has not explained inconsistent switching behavior (e.g., alternation between competition
and non-competition over time) from a dual-system perspective, it seems a likely candidate for the
application of our model.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted to encourage readers to consider the disparate and often
competing goals and psychological motives behind behaviors demonstrated in decision dilemmas, and
why we should expect the observation of quite opposite behaviors and even habits (e.g., consistency
and inconsistency) for DMs facing decision dilemmas. In some cases we can find inter-individual
differences characterized by vary different stable habits for different individuals (e.g., the impulsive
spendthrift vs. the miser) and in other cases we find intra-individual differences in behavior from one
time to another, or from one decision domain to another. As suggested by our model and corroborating
evidence, people facing decision dilemmas may differ in the degree to which they anticipate and
are motivated by either of two conflicting utilities and the degree to which they experience and can
regulate emotional consequences of past decisions [5], and perhaps because of sex differences affecting
the perception of different emotions [149]. The conflicted goal approach of considering a DMs utility
function may be even more important for understanding intra-individual differences revealed at

13

14

Soutschek and colleagues [59] have suggested that the brain regions underlying self-control mechanisms involved in
individual decision dilemmas (e.g., trading off impulsive short vs. restrained long-term goals) are also underlying decisions
in social dilemmas (e.g., trading off exploitative and individually beneficial vs. cooperative and mutually beneficial goals).
Soutschek et al.’s suggestion that a common neural mechanism involved in interpersonal and intertemporal decision-making
makes the strong prediction that preference for delayed (over immediate) rewards in studies of temporal discounting
correlates with preference for cooperation in iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, as also suggested by others [138]. This
correlation has been reported in the context of Prisoner’s Dilemmas played among college students [139,140] and opioid
abusers [141].
Similarly, DMs in competitive markets may be facing decision dilemmas trading off benefits of maximizing their short-term
pay-offs (at others’ expense) and benefits of maximizing their contribution to others’ welfare (which can encourage loyal
mutualism over the long-term). Game theoretic solutions to models of spatial competition (e.g., [45]) show that as DMs in a
competitive market change their locations to capture optimal customer traffic (a limited resource that they compete over),
the costs of competition are affected—changing the landscape of profitability for competitors. Thus, DMs in a dynamic
ecology of spatial competition are constantly trading off what is best for their short-term profits and what may be better for
their long-term profits because it is optimal from a social welfare perspective, that is, in their customers interest (which
contributes to customer loyalty and positive brand reputation). These tradeoffs inherent in market competition may also be
motivating behavior seen in other contest domains.

Games 2017, 8, 22

19 of 25

different points of time or in different decision dilemmas. A single “time preference” propensity
hardly seems to describe the complexity found for any individual’s various behavior regulation habits.
Consider how some people engage in risky driving yet carefully plan for their retirement, while others
smoke like chimneys yet insist on eating only healthy foods. Or consider the politician who carefully
grooms his reputation to build up status and further his career, yet engages in sexual indiscretions
that effectively amount to “career suicide”. Because of our complexity, we each have our unique
struggles and strengths—in some cases discounting the future and in other cases valuing it highly.
What is universal to all humans is that we are emotional creatures composed of multitudes of evolved
cognitive modules reliably organized into dynamic system of behavior regulation.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/2/22/s1.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.
By the emotional balance transition equation and the fact that xt =

ρ
Bt+1 = 1 − λ −
Bt + µ
2

1
2

+ ρ4 Bt we know that
(A1)

Solving recursively, with the initial condition B1 = 0, we get
!

ρ  t −1
1− 1−λ− 2
Bt = 2µ
2λ + ρ

(A2)


Proof of Corollary 1.
Immediate from Proposition 1.

Proof of Corollary 2.
Immediate from Proposition 1.
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